Showing posts with label 1003IBA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1003IBA. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Why Japanese Debt is better than Greek Debt ... and Australia Compared

A lot of guff is written about debt. Part of the problem stems from a failure to distinguish between types of debt - between public and private debt, between foreign and domestic debt and between gross and net debt. I've written about these issues before here and here.

The graph from The Economist shows clearly why the public debt situation in Japan is less worrying than Greece's, despite Greece having a considerably lower level of gross debt.

Gross debt is the preferred focus of news media because it sounds more extreme.



What matters is net debt and how much debt is owed to foreigners.

The problem for Greece (and Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain ... perhaps even France) is that they are stuck with the Euro, which means they can't devalue or inflate their debt levels down. This makes bondholders worried that the eventual outcome will be the departure of some countries from the Euro or default. The two options may of course be related.

Imagine the scenario of Greece going back to the drachma or Spain to the peseta. Both currencies would suffer a large devaluation against the Euro and the dollar - the currencies in which a large part of their debt is denominated in. So while they would get a competitive boost from the devaluation, their debt would expand in local currency terms.

There are no easy options for Europe at the moment.

Interesting to note that a majority of US debt is held domestically. Despite the US debt to China being such a big issue and an indicator of US weakness in relation to China, US debt is more of a problem for China than the US.

Eventually Japan too will have to face up to the issue of just how much debt can you get yourself into before it's unsustainable.

Australia's public debt situation is remarkable by comparison as the following graphs from The Final Budget Outcome for 2010-11 released recently.  Neverthless, as I recently argued in "Structural Shenanigans in the Australian Economy" for Australian Policy Online, Australia's private foreign debt and household debt is still a major issue for the economy.


Friday, October 14, 2011

Basic Economics for Australia

This is the best article I have read on the economics of recent policy changes for quite some time. All students (and perhaps Coalition politicians) should read it.

Jessica Irvine
Economics by book not for Abbott
October 14, 2011


Economics textbooks are hefty objects. Many a kinked neck and curved spine have resulted from children being forced to lug such weighty tomes between school and home.
Whether many students manage to read and absorb the often turgid contents of such books remains an open question.
But the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and the Treasurer, Wayne Swan, have proven diligent students. Many of the hallmark economic policies of this Labor government - pricing carbon, the mining tax, fiscal stimulus and even efforts to cap middle-class welfare - could be torn straight from the pages of your typical HSC economics textbook.
Forcing big polluters to pay for the pollution they emit is economics 101. To an economist's mind, pollution is the ultimate example of an ''externality''. Externalities arise when the total costs or benefits of an activity are not borne entirely by the producer of that activity, but are imposed, in part, upon the rest of society. This can be a good thing. Investments in new technologies can produce ''positive externalities'', or ''technology spillovers'', if the resulting new technology is of potentially wider application.
That is why economists often support government subsidies for research and development. Without such subsidies, the market would produce less investment in this new technology than would be socially optimal. Any economics textbook will tell you such externalities are a case of market failure, where the level of activity produced by the free market is not socially optimal. Society is better off when governments intervene to promote the activities that generate positive externalities, or to discourage activities with negative externalities.
When your neighbour strikes up her lawnmower at 7am on a Saturday, no doubt she is doing it because it is the best use of her time. But her actions create a negative externality - noise - which affects all within earshot. The neighbourhood as a whole would be better off - enjoying more sleep and harmony - if she did not engage in such industrious activity so early in the morning. That is why local councils commonly impose curfews on the use of loud machinery, to control the noise externality.
Pollution is the textbook example of such a negative externality. If producers are not forced to pay for the pollution they emit as part of their production process, they tend to do more of it than would be socially optimal. Pollution imposes a cost on the rest of society - through global warming, increased severe weather events and drought - that is not borne by the producers themselves. Making polluters pay, even if they pass some of this cost on to consumers, corrects for this externality and gives them an incentive to pollute less.
The economic theory behind the government's proposed minerals resource rent tax is similarly standard economics fare. Economists are always looking for ways to raise tax in a way that interferes with economic activity as little as possible. Land, being immoveable, is the ultimate example of something good to tax - land can't move to avoid the tax. Natural resources are also largely immoveable, making them an obvious target for taxation.
But instead of setting an arbitrary annual tax based on the volume of mineral extraction - like state mining royalties - economists consider it far more efficient to tax natural resource producers as a percentage of their profits. In particular, it makes sense to tax mining companies on their ''above normal profits'', that is, not just the reasonable rate of return required to tempt them into extracting resources in the first place, but the return they receive in excess of that due to the scarcity of the resource and the monopoly power they have over production at a particular mine. This is the essence of the mining tax.
The government's multibillion-dollar stimulus program unleashed at the beginning of the global financial crisis was also by the book. It is no overstatement to say it represents perhaps the finest example of Keynesian fiscal stimulus employed by any country to date. With private demand in retreat, the government stepped forward quickly with public demand to prop up growth and employment, helping Australia to avoid recession. Crucially, the stimulus was designed to be temporary, so when the economy was on the mend the withdrawal of stimulus ensured government policy was Keynesian on the upside, too.
Carbon tax, mining tax and fiscal stimulus: a holy trinity of good economic policies that, instead of earning Labor a reputation for fine economic management, have somehow bred only discontent and fear.
Because while Labor has proved a good economics student, it has proved a woeful economics teacher, failing to impress upon voters the important and prudent nature of its reforms.
It has no doubt faced fierce opposition in building the case for good economic policy. Labor swallowed the economics textbook whole, but choked politically in the process.
But in Tony Abbott's hands, the economic textbook seems little more than a handy blunt object with which to whack one's opposition. The Opposition Leader appears hell-bent on styling himself as some sort of economic Antichrist.
Where Labor seeks a market-based solution to the problem of climate change, Abbott wants a multibillion-dollar system of grants, where the government will pick winners for funding to reduce emissions.
Where Labor seeks a minerals resource rent tax in line with Ken Henry's recommendation, Abbott wants to axe the tax, meaning a return to inefficient state mining royalties.

Abbott lampooned the government's fiscal stimulus to such a degree that it is not at all clear he would attempt any such action should global economic conditions deteriorate.
I was at the lunch earlier this year at Melbourne University when Abbott slapped down a roomful (outdoor tentful, actually) of Australia's most respected economists for their advocacy of a price on carbon. ''Maybe that's a comment on the quality of our economists,'' the Rhodes scholar and Sydney University economics graduate chided his audience.
Certainly, the comment raised some eyebrows. But mostly, the reaction seemed one of ''well, he would say that wouldn't he?''
Tony Abbott has made it abundantly clear that the arguments set out in economists' textbooks do not impress or interest him.
Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/economics-by-book-not-for-abbott-20111013-1ln1b.html#ixzz1ajjutopH

Monday, August 22, 2011

Just how good has Australia's economic performance been?

A good aggregate indication of a country's economic performance is real GDP per capita (GDP per person).

The graph from The Economist shows that the best performer over the last 3 and half years have been China and India. Argentina has also done very well, a fact that may give Americans and Southern Europeans some faith in the ability of an economy to recover from financial disaster! Indonesia has also been a quiet achiever. 

What you might notice is that the best performers have mainly been emerging economies with Taiwan and South Korea as exceptions. 

Australia's position is also fairly good, especially in comparison to other developed economies. Canada is still 1% below its pre-crisis level and America is down 3.5%. Britain has performed even worse. So while many might complain about wasted spending. In a time of stagnation policy-makers in Britain and the United States would do well to remember that cutting sending at such a time is likely to exacerbate the situation.



Monday, August 15, 2011

Structural Change in the Australian Economy

While this might seem like a boring topic, it's probably one of the most important medium to long term economic issues facing us as Australians. 

I have recently written a piece for APO, called Structural Shenanigans in the Australian Economy. The APO  is the best source of information on Australian policy issues. It is run by Peter Browne from Swinburne, who given the amount of work he does must never sleep!

Click on the link above if you want a read or paste this into your browser http://www.apo.org.au/commentary/structural-shenanigans-australian-economy ...

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

Stagnation, debt and inequality

The following is from the Unconventional Economist (Leith van Onselen), who I encourage students to read via the Macrobusiness Superblog. Your parents (or you) might benefit from a reading of his (and Delusional Economics') views on housing. 

Leith highlights a report from Societe Generale’s Albert Edwards.  This is a negative view of the global economy, but one I have long worried about since preparing the manuscript for The Vulnerable Country from 2006.

As we see a short-lived economic recovery failing only two years into the cycle and a plunge back into recession, we remind investors that this was exactly the Ice Age template that Japan showed us. A fragile recovery undermined by private sector deleveraging collapses as a semi-bankrupt government tries to rein in runaway deficits…
I and many others have been pointing out for a long time now the simple fact that the global economy has been living way beyond its means for years. A massive transfer of income to the very rich has occurred while middle class real incomes stagnated. The middle classes only tolerated this because Central Bankers created housing booms to keep the impoverished middle classes borrowing and spending to give them the illusion of prosperity and stop them from revolting. I believe the Fed and Bank of England, in particular, were wholly complicit in this ‘daylight robbery’.
These unsustainable private sector, debt mountains were transferred to the public sector in 2008 to prevent the adjustment to the depression-era reality that the debt unwind would undoubtedly have brought about. Yet, those debts are as unsustainable in the hands of the public sector as they were in the private sector. Central bank polices haven’t changed though. Print and print and print. And if that doesn’t work, print some more. And as London burns, the point I have always made is that the US and UK are not like Japan in one very special way. Although Japan suffered a decade of pain it is a very homogenous, equal society (see below). The UK and US are not…
In the Eurozone, the markets are now realising what should have been obvious from the start. The authorities are in very little position to halt the rot. During the bubble (aka The Great Moderation) the Eurozone had the same mechanics of mutually assured economic destruction that was seen on a grander scale between China and the US, viz the excessively loose US monetary policy causing a housing and spending boom that resulted in a huge trade deficit, financed in the main by a willingly mercantilist China printing money ad infinitum to keep their fixed exchange rate link (incidentally it’s a bit rich for the Chinese to complain about the US profligacy when they are just as bad when it comes to cranking the printing press).
The Eurozone has been no different to this unstable US/China nexus, with some member countries enjoying (suffering?) super loose monetary policies through no fault of their own (unlike the US), leading to housing and spending booms causing huge trade deficits funded in the main by Germany with a Chinese-style trade surplus, with their banks lending money to the deficit nations in the periphery to keep the party going.
So, during the Great Moderation, although the overall trade situation of the Eurozone seemed to be in external balance with the rest of the world, under the surface the situation was always every bit as unstable and poisonous as the US/China situation…

Edwards makes several important points about the problems at the heart of current global problems and much of it can be slated back to rising inequality, the third of the key vulnerabilities facing Australia, but obviously much more acute in the US and UK.

If globalisation (meaning here the proclivity towards freer trade and finance) is to remain sustainable then it has to be accompanied by redistribution of opportunity and of wealth, otherwise populists of the right (and left) will gain increasing leverage over political processes and lead to a return to insularity.

The massive transfer of wealth to the rich in the US is not seen, unfortunately, as a cause of US problems by supporters of the extreme right. Instead mild efforts to maintain growth in the US are seen as signs of rising socialism.

The US economy is in deep trouble not because its debt is unsustainable - its not - but because the political process is broken. Some basic measures to raise taxes on the very rich and make corporations pay tax, at the same time as increasing spending on worthwhile labour market programs and infrastructure development would make a big difference.

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

The Man without a Facebook

 For those students in 1003IBA and our discussion about facebook, globalisation and alienation ...



My favourite line ...
"you aint googling diddly squat"

Monday, August 1, 2011

The Debt Ceiling

As expected the US Congress and the President came to some sort of arrangement to ensure that the US does not default on its debt obligations. No one, however, seems to be satisfied. The only feasible political solution involves a balance of spending cuts and tax increases. Obama has it right on this. But the correct economic solution at the moment is not to cut spending at a time of economic stagnation. A better economic solution would be to raise taxes on those who can most afford it and are unlikely to curb their spending habits if their after tax income is reduced slightly i.e. the rich!

Generally it has been Republican presidents that have been the biggest spenders, rather than so-called "tax and spend" Democrats. See here for an analysis.  

If you're looking for a primer on the crisis, this from the NYT is pretty good.


Some of the important bits from the NYT article.

Q. Republicans and Democrats alike keep talking about the need to reduce the federal deficit. Won’t refusing to raise the debt limit cut the deficit?

A. No. The debt limit, or ceiling, which is the amount that the nation is allowed to borrow, must be raised if the United States is to pay for all the things that Congress has already bought: the spending in the budget bills it has already passed, the Social Security checks promised to retirees, the payments due to private companies with federal contracts and the interest on bonds it has sold. Washington has long spent more money than it takes in, and planned to make up the difference with borrowing. Both parties agree that this cannot go on forever. But if the debt limit is not raised, it will not cut the nation’s deficit or allow the government to get out of its existing obligations. It will simply make it impossible to borrow the money that the government needs to pay for them.
... “While debates surrounding the debt limit may raise awareness about the federal government’s current debt trajectory and may also provide Congress with an opportunity to debate the fiscal policy decisions driving that trajectory, the ability to have an immediate effect on debt levels is limited,” the Government Accountability Office reported. “This is because the debt reflects previously enacted tax and spending policies.”



Q. This sounds like an odd system. Do you mean that Congress can pass a budget that requires borrowing, and then argue later about whether to approve that borrowing?
A. That’s right. The system goes back to World War I, when Congress first put a limit on federal debt. The limit was part of a law that allowed the Treasury to issue Liberty Bonds to help pay for the war. The law was intended to give the Treasury greater discretion over borrowing by eliminating the need for Congress to approve each new issuance of debt. Over the years the limit has been raised repeatedly, to $14.3 trillion today from roughly $43 billion in 1940. Of the $14.3 trillion, $4.6 trillion is held by other government accounts, like Social Security trust funds. Outside observers have noted that the failure to make increases in the debt limit part of the regular budget process can be risky. The G.A.O. concluded that it would be better if “decisions about the debt level occur in conjunction with spending and revenue decisions as opposed to the after-the-fact approach now used,” adding that doing so “would help avoid the uncertainty and disruptions that occur during debates on the debt limit today.”



Q. So what happens to government spending if the debt limit is not raised? Will the United States default?
A. The United States will not have enough money to pay all of its bills. The country technically hit the debt ceiling in May, but it instituted a series of temporary measures to avoid having to raise the limit that the Treasury estimates will run out around Aug. 2. So what does that mean? The United States will owe about $307 billion during the rest of August, but it is expecting to take in about $172 billion in revenues, according to an analysis by the Bipartisan Policy Center. Without enough money to pay all of its bills, the government will have to decide what to do. The possibilities range from “prioritizing” some payments and paying them first to paying bills in the order in which they were received.

The Bipartisan Policy Center analysis notes that if the government were to choose to pay the interest on its debt, Social Security benefits, Medicaid and Medicare payments, defense contractors and unemployment benefits, it could not have enough left to pay for the salaries of federal workers and members of the military, Pell grants for college, highway construction or tax refunds, among other things. Some analysts argue that as long as the nation continues making its payments on the national debt, it will not be in default. The Treasury disputes that, arguing that “adopting a policy that payments to investors should take precedence over other U.S. legal obligations would merely be default by another name, since the world would recognize it as a failure by the United States to stand behind its commitments.”



Q. What could a default mean for the economy?
A. It could be bad, on several levels. A default is typically a decision not to pay government bondholders back, in part or in full, but the rating agencies have said they might consider the United States in default if it fails to pay other creditors like government vendors. If the federal government interrupts payments, whether to Social Security recipients or contractors, those people will then have less money to spend, and the economy will slow down. And if the United States defaults on its debt, there is a risk that the investors could demand a higher interest rate. Then, consumers could also feel the pinch: because the interest rates paid by corporations and consumers in the United States are tied to the rate the nation pays, interest rates could go up for everything from credit cards to mortgages. A homeowner with a mortgage for $100,000 might see her annual mortgage costs go up by $100 to $200 a year, economists say.
So the failure to raise the debt limit could slow the nation’s recovery, Ben S. Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, warned in a speech last month. “Failing to raise the debt limit would require the federal government to delay or renege on payments for obligations already entered into,” he said. “In particular, even a short suspension of payments on principal or interest on the Treasury’s debt obligations could cause severe disruptions in financial markets and the payments system, induce ratings downgrades of U.S. government debt, create fundamental doubts about the creditworthiness of the United States and damage the special role of the dollar and Treasury securities in global markets in the longer term. Interest rates would likely rise, slowing the recovery and, perversely, worsening the deficit problem by increasing required interest payments on the debt for what might well be a protracted period.”

...

Q. What about the rest of the world? Will other countries continue to invest in the United States? Would a default send investors to the safety of other currencies?
A. There are already indications that this is beginning to happen. Switzerland’s franc strengthened to a record high against the dollar this week, as concern about the debt limit in the United States and worries about the euro, given the Greek crisis, sent investors looking for safety. Some bond funds are already moving to invest in bonds from Canada, Mexico and China. And there are concerns about what would happen if America’s foreign creditors, led by China, were to try to dump some of their American debt. In the last decade, foreign money has poured into the United States, creating so much demand for Treasury bills that it has kept the United States’ interest rate low. This month, the authorities in Beijing expressed concern about the debt standoff in the United States. “We hope that the U.S. government adopts responsible policies and measures to guarantee the interests of investors,” said Hong Lei, a Foreign Ministry spokesman.



Q. How many times has the debt ceiling been raised, and by whom?
A. It has been a bipartisan exercise. By the Treasury Department’s count, Congress has acted 78 times since 1960 to raise, extend or alter the definition of the debt limit — 49 times under Republican presidents, and 29 times under Democratic presidents. The Obama administration has taken pains to note that President Ronald Reagan, a hero to many Republicans in Congress, raised the debt limit. In a letter on the debt ceiling last month to Republicans in the Senate, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner quoted a letter Mr. Reagan wrote a generation ago, urging Congress to increase the debt limit. “The full consequences of a default — or even the serious prospect of default — by the United States are impossible to predict and awesome to contemplate,” he quoted Mr. Reagan as writing. “Denigration of the full faith and credit of the United States would have substantial effects on the domestic financial markets and on the value of the dollar in exchange markets. The Nation can ill afford to allow such a result.”



Q. How has the debt risen this high, and how much are we paying in interest as a nation?
A. The United States has not always operated with such a large debt. After financing World War II with substantial borrowing, the outstanding debt held pretty stable for the next 25 years, going up to $283 billion in 1970 from $242 billion in 1946. But over the last 30 years, the overall debt has increased under every president — with the biggest increase under President George W. Bush, who cut taxes, added a drug benefit to Medicare and fought two wars. As the debt has grown, so have the country’s interest payments. In 2003, for instance, the government paid about $150 billion in interest costs; this year it is estimated to be upward of $200 billion. These interest payments are taking up more federal spending now than federal outlays on education, transportation and housing and urban development combined. Though the interest costs are substantial, they have remained lower than some economists predicted because the world has continued to lend money to the United States at very low interest rates, even as the nation’s debt has grown.



Q. Has what is going on in Washington already hurt the economy and the reputation of the United States in financial markets around the world?
A. Stocks fell steeply on Wednesday on worries that the United States could default or see its credit rating cut, and Treasury market analysts and traders are already saying that the credibility of the United States has been damaged. Mark Zandi, the chief economist of Moody’s Analytics, said last week: “Our aura is diminished. You know people really view the U.S. as the AAA, the gold standard, and I think we’re tarnishing that.” Treasury bonds have always been considered to be virtually risk-free, and that is why many investors — in the United States and abroad — hold them and many companies use them to back up other investments. If their security is questioned, investors may shift away from them. The caveat, though, is that there are few safe places today for investors to put their cash. So some traders say that investors may see few alternatives, and opt to stay put.



Q. Has the United States defaulted on its debt before?
A. Technically, yes. In 1979, as Congress was considering raising the debt limit, negotiations ran down to the wire. The Treasury Department had what it called technological glitches, and it was late paying a relatively small number of its Treasury notes. This amounted to a technical default, not a permanent one, because the note holders were eventually paid in full. Some finance professors who have studied the incident say it led to higher interest rates.

See also this from the NYT