The World's Most Important Economic Relationship? US-China Trade and Investment

The economic relationship between the United States is one of the world's most important. The trade balance is considerably in China's favour and is matched by huge Chinese purchases of US debt securities. Although it has grown significantly in recent years, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States is still negligible at considerably less than one percent and US FDI in China constitutes about 10 per cent of the total.

While it is true that US-China trade as a percentage of China's total trade has been in decline over recent years, the United States and Europe (i.e. most of the developed market economies) remain key elements of final demand for products exported from China, but often sourced from other countries in Asia and from the United States itself.

The Trade Relationship

The trade relationship is marked by tensions as politicians in the United States seek to blame China for US economic woes. A Romney ad states: "It’s time to stand up to the cheaters and make sure we protect jobs for the American people." Meanwhile an Obama ad responds: "Romney’s companies were called pioneers in shipping U.S. manufacturing jobs overseas. He invested in firms that specialized in relocating jobs to low-wage countries like China. Even today part of Romney’s fortune is invested in China. Romney’s never stood up to China. All he’s done is send them our jobs."

Mutual suspicions about security issues increase the potential for economic conflict. But generally candidates are more critical during election campaigns, downplaying the rhetoric and action when in office.

US merchandise trade with China have grown markedly in importance since 1980 as the table below makes clear. [trade figures are generally divided into merchandise and services trade and services trade figures are often not included even though this is often unstated.]

The United States and China trades reestablished diplomatic relations and signed a bilateral trade agreement 1979, while most-favored-nation (MFN) status was granted in 1980.

My source: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf

In 2011 merchandise exports to China increased to $103.9 billion, up 13.1% over 2010 levels.  China is now the United States' 3rd most important export market, replacing Japan after 2007.

According to Morrison

From 2000 to 2011, the share of total U.S. exports going to China rose from 2.1% to 7.0%. The top five merchandise U.S. exports to China in 2011 were waste and scrap, oilseeds and grains, aircraft and parts, semiconductors and other electronic components, and motor vehicles  China is also a significant market for U.S. exports of private services, which totaled $21.1 billion in 2010 (the most recent year available), which was a 35.3% increase over 2009 levels, making China the seventh-largest export market for U.S. private services.

This means, according to the US-China Business Council (from Morrison) that the "total market for the sale of U.S. goods and services in China (i.e., U.S. exports and sales by U.S.-invested firms in China) could be as high as $200 billion annually." [For up-to-date statistics see the US Census Bureau Stats on Foreign Trade].

The Office for the United States Trade Representative reports that:

U.S. goods and services trade with China totaled $539 billion in 2011. Exports totaled $129 billion; Imports totaled $411 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with China was $282 billion in 2011. China is currently our 2nd largest goods trading partner with $503 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2011. Goods exports totaled $104 billion; Goods imports totaled $399 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with China was $295 billion in 2011. Trade in services with China (exports and imports) totaled $36 billion in 2011 (preliminary data). Services exports were $25 billion; Services imports were $11 billion. The U.S. services trade surplus with China was $13 billion in 2011.

While US exports to China have slowed in recent years in comparison to US trade with the rest of the world over the 10 years from 2002-2011 "U.S. exports to China increased by about 471% (the overall growth in U.S. exports over this period was 213.6%)."

According to the US-China Business Council, the United States was China's biggest trading partner and export market and the 4th biggest import source in 2010.

 However, while China is only the third largest export market for the United States, the US deficit with China is by far and away its biggest deficit.

This headline figure fuels the ire of American protectionists, but masks the extent to which China's 'exports' are re-exports from elsewhere. The iPhone provides a neat illustration of this distortion. According to Yuqing Xing

Using the total manufacturing cost $178.96 as the price of the iPhone, China’s iPhone exports to the US amounted $2.0 billion in 2009. Assuming that the parts supplied by Broadcom, Numonyx and Cirrus Logic, valued at $121.5 million, were imported from the US the iPhone alone contributed $1.9 billion trade deficit to the US, about 0.8% of the US trade deficit with China ...

But 

most of the export value and the deficit due to the iPhone are attributed to imported parts and components from the third countries and have nothing to do with China. Chinese workers simply put all these parts and components together and contributed only $6.50 to each iPhone, about 3.6% of the total manufacturing cost (e.g. the shipping price). The traditional way of measuring trade credits all $178.98 to China when an iPhone is shipped to the US, thus exaggerating the export volume as well as the imbalance. Decomposing the value added along the value chain of the iPhone manufacturing suggest that, of the $2.0 billion iPhone export from China, 96.4% is actually the transfer from Germany ($326 million), Japan ($670 million), Korea ($259 million), the US ($108 million) and others ($542 million). All of these countries are involved in the iPhone production chain.

If China’s iPhone exports were calculated based on the value added, i.e., the assembling cost, the export value as well as the trade deficit in the iPhone would be much smaller, at only $73 million, just 3.6% of the $2.0 billion calculated with the prevailing method.

Morrison also points out that US trade with China has mainly replaced trade with other Pacific Rim countries. [Pacific Rim countries include Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and several small island nations.] In terms of manufactured imports in 1990 47.1% of the value came from Pacific Rim countries (including China), while in 2011 the same countries accounted for 46.1% of the total.  US manufactured imports from China increased from 3.6% to 25.3% over the same period!

While the US-China trade relationship is an important component of each country's trade, the US does not have as much to lose as other countries if Chinese growth slows. Chinese imports make a significant contribution to growth of a wide range of countries, including Australia.

According to Mackenzie "0.6 percentage points of Germany’s 3 per cent GDP growth for 2011 — or, about a fifth — was courtesy of its exports to China ... There’s a certain irony here in that Germany is simultaneously importing less from some eurozone peripherals, to a degree that could be harming their prospects of recovery." For the United States "Chinese imports also contributed to 0.1 percentage points" of 1.7 per cent GDP growth in 2011, which while appearing like an insignificant number is actually "almost 6 per cent of US GDP growth."

When considered in terms of share of total exports, Australia is the second most Chinese-dependent economy in the world. And as I've argued before, the negative impact on Australia of a growth slowdown in China will be felt indirectly as well through the impact on our second and third largest export destinations Japan and Korea. (China accounted for 24.6%, Japan 16.7% and Korea for 8.0% of total exports in 2011)

Similar to Australia, US policy-makers and business people see great potential for future trade with China as it becomes richer and as a growing middle class demands more advanced goods and services. Morrison cites a 2009 Boston Consulting Group report arguing that "China had 148 million 'middle class and affluent' consumers, defined as those whose annual household income was 60,000 RMB ($9,160) or higher, and that level is projected to rise to 415 million by 2020."

Although Chinese private consumption as a percent of GDP is much lower than that of most other major economies, the rate of growth of Chinese private consumption has been rising rapidly. For example, private consumption as a percent of GDP in China in 2011 was 34.0%, compared to 71.1% in the United States. However, the annual rate of growth in Chinese private consumption from 2002 to 2011 averaged 8.0%, while the U.S. annual average was 1.9%. 

The Investment Relationship

The investment relationship is also very significant for both countries and the wider world. A majority of Chinese investment in the United States is in public and private securities (including, according to Morrison, U.S.Treasury securities, U.S. government agency (such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) securities,
corporate securities, and equities (such as stocks)." U.S. Treasury securities "are the largest category of U.S. securities held by China". Most US investment in China is foreign direct investment (investment of greater than 10 per cent in a company).

China's holdings of Treasuries "increased from $118 billion in 2002 to $1.15 trillion in 2011", although holdings declined by 0.7% in 2011. China replaced Japan as the largest holder of Treasury securities in 2008.

There is considerable debate about whether this ownership of treasuries gives China influence over China or whether it signals a so-called balance of financial terror. I've written before about these claims here and here, based on the work of Michael Pettis. To summarise, such claims are overblown. As Pettis points out: 

As long as China maintains its own currency and denominates all domestic transactions in RMB, the PBoC reserves cannot be used in China. They cannot go to pay doctors’ salaries, to build bridges, to lower taxes or to subsidize consumption. They can only be used to purchase or pay for things from outside China. This means that reserves ensure that China can import foreign commodities and other goods as long as it can pay for them domestically. It also means that the PBoC can ensure the availability of dollars to repay foreign debt and foreign investment.  ...

The US government does not need foreign buyers for its bonds. On the contrary, it is in Washington’s best interest that foreign central banks sharply reduce their purchases of USG bonds.

According to Murray and Labonte foreigners owned 56.9% of federal govt debt at the end of 2011, up from 53.5% at the end of 2007.

China holds the largest percentage with 23.1 per cent, followed by Japan with 21.2 per cent. The Luxembourg and Caribbean Banking centres are probably fronts for Middle Eastern buyers and Hedge Funds and in the past China has bought Treasuries through companies operating out of London.

Compared to the amount of foreign investment in securities FDI between the two countries is very small.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative reports that:

U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in China (stock) was $60.5 billion in 2010 (latest data available), a 21.4% increase from 2009. U.S. direct investment in China is led by the manufacturing and banking sectors. China FDI in the United States (stock) was $3.2 billion in 2010 (latest data available), up 171.6% from 2009. China direct investment in the U.S. is led by the wholesale trade sector.

The total stock of FDI in the US in 2010 according to UNCTAD's 2012 World Investment Report was $3,397 billion, which means that the stock of Chinese FDI in the United States as a percentage of the whole was 0.09%.

According to Morrison, the Bureau of Economic Affairs (the US equivalent to the ABS) adds FDI from China and for China through offshore centres such as Hong Kong and designates this calculation the “ultimate beneficial owner” (UBO) of FDI. This increases the amount of "China’s cumulative FDI flows to the United States through 2010 by 86% to $5.8 billion."

If we use this enhanced figure it means that China's percentage of  total FDI was 0.17% in 2010.

Even this UBO figure "would rank China as the 30th-largest source of total FDI in the United States through 2010.

The Rhodium Group (a private research consultancy and advisory company) estimates cumulative Chinese FDI flows to the United States through the end of 2010 at $11.7 billion and that the amount of new Chinese FDI in the United States in 2010 was $5.2 billion. 

Accepting this higher figure would mean that, like Australia, recent increases in Chinese FDI in the United States are significant but from a very low base. To put the US figure in context, the total stock of Chinese FDI in Australia at the end of 2011 was AUD13.3 billion.

US FDI in China ($60.5) billion as a percentage of the total stock in 2010 ($587.8 billion) was 10.3% of the total.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Asia has outperformed the rest of the world over recent years. But the pertinent question to ask is whether it can continue to perform well if growth stays anaemic in Europe (the world's most important economic region), the United States (the world's largest economy) and Japan (the world's third largest economy). As Michael Pettis argues in his latest newsletter, what the world needs form China at the moment is not more growth, but more net demand.

A rebalancing Chinese economy that grows at a slower rate but a shift in wealth towards households will be good for the United States, but perhaps bad for Australia.

The Debt Ceiling

As expected the US Congress and the President came to some sort of arrangement to ensure that the US does not default on its debt obligations. No one, however, seems to be satisfied. The only feasible political solution involves a balance of spending cuts and tax increases. Obama has it right on this. But the correct economic solution at the moment is not to cut spending at a time of economic stagnation. A better economic solution would be to raise taxes on those who can most afford it and are unlikely to curb their spending habits if their after tax income is reduced slightly i.e. the rich!

Generally it has been Republican presidents that have been the biggest spenders, rather than so-called "tax and spend" Democrats. See here for an analysis.  

If you're looking for a primer on the crisis, this from the NYT is pretty good.

Some of the important bits from the NYT article.

Q. Republicans and Democrats alike keep talking about the need to reduce the federal deficit. Won’t refusing to raise the debt limit cut the deficit?

A. No. The debt limit, or ceiling, which is the amount that the nation is allowed to borrow, must be raised if the United States is to pay for all the things that Congress has already bought: the spending in the budget bills it has already passed, the Social Security checks promised to retirees, the payments due to private companies with federal contracts and the interest on bonds it has sold. Washington has long spent more money than it takes in, and planned to make up the difference with borrowing. Both parties agree that this cannot go on forever. But if the debt limit is not raised, it will not cut the nation’s deficit or allow the government to get out of its existing obligations. It will simply make it impossible to borrow the money that the government needs to pay for them.

... “While debates surrounding the debt limit may raise awareness about the federal government’s current debt trajectory and may also provide Congress with an opportunity to debate the fiscal policy decisions driving that trajectory, the ability to have an immediate effect on debt levels is limited,” the Government Accountability Office reported. “This is because the debt reflects previously enacted tax and spending policies.”

Q. This sounds like an odd system. Do you mean that Congress can pass a budget that requires borrowing, and then argue later about whether to approve that borrowing?

A. That’s right. The system goes back to World War I, when Congress first put a limit on federal debt. The limit was part of a law that allowed the Treasury to issue Liberty Bonds to help pay for the war. The law was intended to give the Treasury greater discretion over borrowing by eliminating the need for Congress to approve each new issuance of debt. Over the years the limit has been raised repeatedly, to $14.3 trillion today from roughly $43 billion in 1940. Of the $14.3 trillion, $4.6 trillion is held by other government accounts, like Social Security trust funds. Outside observers have noted that the failure to make increases in the debt limit part of the regular budget process can be risky. The G.A.O. concluded that it would be better if “decisions about the debt level occur in conjunction with spending and revenue decisions as opposed to the after-the-fact approach now used,” adding that doing so “would help avoid the uncertainty and disruptions that occur during debates on the debt limit today.”

Q. So what happens to government spending if the debt limit is not raised? Will the United States default?
A. The United States will not have enough money to pay all of its bills. The country technically hit the debt ceiling in May, but it instituted a series of temporary measures to avoid having to raise the limit that the Treasury estimates will run out around Aug. 2. So what does that mean? The United States will owe about $307 billion during the rest of August, but it is expecting to take in about $172 billion in revenues, according to an analysis by the Bipartisan Policy Center. Without enough money to pay all of its bills, the government will have to decide what to do. The possibilities range from “prioritizing” some payments and paying them first to paying bills in the order in which they were received.

The Bipartisan Policy Center analysis notes that if the government were to choose to pay the interest on its debt, Social Security benefits, Medicaid and Medicare payments, defense contractors and unemployment benefits, it could not have enough left to pay for the salaries of federal workers and members of the military, Pell grants for college, highway construction or tax refunds, among other things. Some analysts argue that as long as the nation continues making its payments on the national debt, it will not be in default. The Treasury disputes that, arguing that “adopting a policy that payments to investors should take precedence over other U.S. legal obligations would merely be default by another name, since the world would recognize it as a failure by the United States to stand behind its commitments.”

Q. What could a default mean for the economy?

A. It could be bad, on several levels. A default is typically a decision not to pay government bondholders back, in part or in full, but the rating agencies have said they might consider the United States in default if it fails to pay other creditors like government vendors. If the federal government interrupts payments, whether to Social Security recipients or contractors, those people will then have less money to spend, and the economy will slow down. And if the United States defaults on its debt, there is a risk that the investors could demand a higher interest rate. Then, consumers could also feel the pinch: because the interest rates paid by corporations and consumers in the United States are tied to the rate the nation pays, interest rates could go up for everything from credit cards to mortgages. A homeowner with a mortgage for $100,000 might see her annual mortgage costs go up by $100 to $200 a year, economists say.

So the failure to raise the debt limit could slow the nation’s recovery, Ben S. Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, warned in a speech last month. “Failing to raise the debt limit would require the federal government to delay or renege on payments for obligations already entered into,” he said. “In particular, even a short suspension of payments on principal or interest on the Treasury’s debt obligations could cause severe disruptions in financial markets and the payments system, induce ratings downgrades of U.S. government debt, create fundamental doubts about the creditworthiness of the United States and damage the special role of the dollar and Treasury securities in global markets in the longer term. Interest rates would likely rise, slowing the recovery and, perversely, worsening the deficit problem by increasing required interest payments on the debt for what might well be a protracted period.”

...

Q. What about the rest of the world? Will other countries continue to invest in the United States? Would a default send investors to the safety of other currencies?

A. There are already indications that this is beginning to happen. Switzerland’s franc strengthened to a record high against the dollar this week, as concern about the debt limit in the United States and worries about the euro, given the Greek crisis, sent investors looking for safety. Some bond funds are already moving to invest in bonds from Canada, Mexico and China. And there are concerns about what would happen if America’s foreign creditors, led by China, were to try to dump some of their American debt. In the last decade, foreign money has poured into the United States, creating so much demand for Treasury bills that it has kept the United States’ interest rate low. This month, the authorities in Beijing expressed concern about the debt standoff in the United States. “We hope that the U.S. government adopts responsible policies and measures to guarantee the interests of investors,” said Hong Lei, a Foreign Ministry spokesman.

Q. How many times has the debt ceiling been raised, and by whom?

A. It has been a bipartisan exercise. By the Treasury Department’s count, Congress has acted 78 times since 1960 to raise, extend or alter the definition of the debt limit — 49 times under Republican presidents, and 29 times under Democratic presidents. The Obama administration has taken pains to note that President Ronald Reagan, a hero to many Republicans in Congress, raised the debt limit. In a letter on the debt ceiling last month to Republicans in the Senate, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner quoted a letter Mr. Reagan wrote a generation ago, urging Congress to increase the debt limit. “The full consequences of a default — or even the serious prospect of default — by the United States are impossible to predict and awesome to contemplate,” he quoted Mr. Reagan as writing. “Denigration of the full faith and credit of the United States would have substantial effects on the domestic financial markets and on the value of the dollar in exchange markets. The Nation can ill afford to allow such a result.”

Q. How has the debt risen this high, and how much are we paying in interest as a nation?

A. The United States has not always operated with such a large debt. After financing World War II with substantial borrowing, the outstanding debt held pretty stable for the next 25 years, going up to $283 billion in 1970 from $242 billion in 1946. But over the last 30 years, the overall debt has increased under every president — with the biggest increase under President George W. Bush, who cut taxes, added a drug benefit to Medicare and fought two wars. As the debt has grown, so have the country’s interest payments. In 2003, for instance, the government paid about $150 billion in interest costs; this year it is estimated to be upward of $200 billion. These interest payments are taking up more federal spending now than federal outlays on education, transportation and housing and urban development combined. Though the interest costs are substantial, they have remained lower than some economists predicted because the world has continued to lend money to the United States at very low interest rates, even as the nation’s debt has grown.

Q. Has what is going on in Washington already hurt the economy and the reputation of the United States in financial markets around the world?
A. Stocks fell steeply on Wednesday on worries that the United States could default or see its credit rating cut, and Treasury market analysts and traders are already saying that the credibility of the United States has been damaged. Mark Zandi, the chief economist of Moody’s Analytics, said last week: “Our aura is diminished. You know people really view the U.S. as the AAA, the gold standard, and I think we’re tarnishing that.” Treasury bonds have always been considered to be virtually risk-free, and that is why many investors — in the United States and abroad — hold them and many companies use them to back up other investments. If their security is questioned, investors may shift away from them. The caveat, though, is that there are few safe places today for investors to put their cash. So some traders say that investors may see few alternatives, and opt to stay put.

Q. Has the United States defaulted on its debt before?

A. Technically, yes. In 1979, as Congress was considering raising the debt limit, negotiations ran down to the wire. The Treasury Department had what it called technological glitches, and it was late paying a relatively small number of its Treasury notes. This amounted to a technical default, not a permanent one, because the note holders were eventually paid in full. Some finance professors who have studied the incident say it led to higher interest rates.

See also this from the NYT