The Australian Economy in 2012

When the world economy recovered strongly in 2010, many commentators believed that the great recession was over. In Australia, we still have commentators who fully dismiss that there was any need for action to bolster the Australian economy during 2008 and 2009. This is despite the fact that government guarantees kept the banks afloat (no thanks from the banks for that now), the Reserve bank's monetary stimulus bolstered mortgagees' spending power and Treasury's fiscal stimulus bolstered confidence just at the right time.If you have a look at the graph below you will see that the world economy contracted during this period - an unusual event - and the Australian economy did not.

Successful fiscal stimulus is a bit like averting a terrorist attack. People don't really appreciate what might have been if the action to avert the problem had not been taken.

The subsequent reinvigoration of the Chinese economy through government action also acted to bolster the economy further in 2010, making many people argue that there was no value in the building of school facilities that followed. Anyone who has a child at school or goes to a university will realise that there have been some marvellous facilities built that will benefit students far into the future. The Building the Education Program may have been rushed and it may not have been an effective form of fiscal policy, but it was in the main an effective piece of infrastructure development in Australia.

One building company owner in South Australia made it clear to me that without the prospective work, layoffs would have been significant in his company. So we've been doing fairly well, despite some real and significant problems associated with structural change in the Australian economy.

The Reserve Bank is a prolific publisher of research and its key figures regularly give speeches on the state of the Australian and world economies. Phillip Lowe, the Deputy Governor, gave a speech this morning on "The Forces Shaping the Economy Over 2012.

The first thing to note is that the world economy is expected to do worse than thought in September 2011. Most forecasts have been revised downwards in recent times.

But compared to 2009, this is still a good performance. Europe remains the major problem. According to Lowe:

Working through the various challenges is taking the Europeans time. The process has been frustratingly slow and we have witnessed some missteps along the way. But for all of that, we should not lose sight of the fact that progress is being made. Late last year there was a palpable sense that something might go badly wrong over our summer. Clearly, that has not happened. Instead, government bond yields for some of the troubled countries in Europe have declined a little (Graph 2). Equity markets have picked up and confidence has improved a bit. And significantly, bank debt markets are functioning again, although the cost of issuing bank debt, relative to government yields, is higher than it was in the middle of last year.



Lowe notes that one of the problems for 2012-13 is the fact that many countries are undergoing fiscal consolidation at the same time, providing a significant drag on growth, although he doesn't want to sound too much like a booster.  

Over 2012 and 2013, fiscal policy is set to be quite contractionary in both Europe and the United States as governments attempt to put their public finances on a sounder footing. Indeed, the aggregate fiscal contraction across the advanced economies is likely to be the largest seen for many decades. This is not because the size of the fiscal consolidations in individual countries is unprecedented, but rather because the consolidations are occurring simultaneously in a large number of countries. Unusually, they are also taking place in an environment where output in the affected countries is considerably below potential.

The economic literature is mixed on the effects of fiscal consolidation on growth. There are certainly some examples where consolidation has been associated with fairly strong GDP growth. But in most of these examples, the countries undertaking the fiscal consolidation have benefited from some combination of robust growth in their trading partners, an easing of monetary policy and a depreciation of their exchange rate. Given the nature of the current situation, it is unlikely that the advanced economies, as a whole, can benefit from these factors. There is therefore a material risk that fiscal consolidation weakens growth in the short run, which leads to more fiscal consolidation in order to meet previously announced targets and, in turn, yet weaker growth. We are currently seeing this dynamic play out in a couple of the countries in southern Europe. If it is not to be repeated on a wider scale, the fiscal consolidation in the North Atlantic economies will need to be accompanied by reforms to the supply side that lift the underlying rate of growth of these economies.

In other words widespread fiscal contraction provides a big risk of a negative spiral and a long period of stagnation. All of which is going to be exacerbated by continuing household and wider private sector deleveraging.

The US is increasingly being seen more positively, but it might be too early to open up the champagne just yet.

The US is paying off debt more quickly than many other countries as a recent McKinsey report noted.

Household debt outstanding has fallen by $584 billion (4 percent) from the end of 2008 through the second quarter of 2011 in the United States. Defaults account for about 70 and 80 percent of the decrease in mortgage debt and consumer credit, respectively. A majority of the defaults reflect financial distress: overextended homeowners who lost jobs during the recession or faced medical emergencies found that they could not afford to keep up with debt payments. It is estimated that up to 35 percent of the defaults resulted from strategic decisions by households to walk away from their homes, since they owed far more than their properties were worth. This option is more available in the United States than in other countries, because in 11 of the 50 states—including hard-hit Arizona and California—mortgages are nonrecourse

The report argues that the US is further down the path of deleveraging than Spain or the UK, but the default part of the equation is perhaps no reason to be jumping for joy. McKinsey bases their assumption on a historical trend line of increasing debt and argue that the US may be half way through the deleveraging process.

But think about it this is a trend line from 1955. Eventually the trend line will reach 130% of GDP, perhaps by 2040, which would mean deleveraging during the 2050s could involve a decline from an above trend 140% of GDP ... or whatever. The point is the assumption of an ever-expanding trend line is a furphy. Credit really takes off in the early 1980s with financial liberalisation and the massive expansion of credit that followed. Believing the trend line would mean accepting that eventually. perhaps by 2100, that household debt at 200% of GDP was sustainable.

Comparison with deleveraging in Sweden after their severe financial crisis is quite illuminating. It also makes clear that the UK and Spain also have a long way to go before their episodes of deleveraging are finished.

But anyway the report is well worth a read, just to see why this period of economic stagnation may be a long one. For a look at some comparable figures on Australian household debt see here.

Lowe downplays the impact of China  in the speech:

The Chinese economy is also continuing to grow solidly. The pace of growth has slowed, but it has done so in line with the authorities’ intentions. Inflation in China has also moderated. Across the rest of east Asia, the recent data have been mixed. Nevertheless, for the region as a whole, growth in 2012 is expected to be around trend, with domestic demand likely to play a more important role in generating growth than it has for most of the past two decades.

Let's hope his anodyne assessment is correct.

Lowe then moves to the Australian economy and notes the significance of the once in a lifetime investment that is happening right now.

As you can see from the graph the projected level of investment is huge, belying the regular scare-mongering from the resources sector.

But as many of you will now know this investment has been heavily concentrated in the resource sector and is part of the equation leading to a higher exchange rate.

 

I used to amuse students with stories of the Australian dollar at around 1.50, which seemed rather ridiculous at the turn of the millennium when it hovered around 50%.

Given the importance of the RBA in managing the Australian economy it is worthwhile considering how they see these developments.

The effects of the high exchange rate are evident in the manufacturing, tourism and education sectors, as well as some parts of the agriculture sector and, more recently, in some business services sectors. With the exchange rate having been high for some time now, more businesses are re-evaluating their strategies, as well as their medium term prospects. In some cases, this is prompting renewed investment to improve firms’ international competitiveness. But in other cases, businesses are scaling back their operations in Australia and some are closing down. These changes are obviously very difficult for the firms and individuals involved.  

Both the investment boom and the very high level of the exchange rate are historically very unusual events. This makes it difficult to assess their net effect. It seems, however, that over the past year these forces have balanced out reasonably evenly. 

In other words, don't worry, be happy. While it was slightly cool to be a pessimist before the crash it's now much cooler to be an optimist as a range of recent articles and books have pointed out.

United States Debt: Who Buys It?

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US debt purchases have become an important story in the world political economy and a symbol of supposed US powerlessness in the face of a relentless Chinese ascendancy. I think this equation is overdone and instead think that the fact that the Chinese feel obliged to buy US debt as a sign of continued Chinese weakness in their economic structure rather than strength. But it undoubtedly is a complicated debate.

But let us at least get a few facts on the table.

The first is to look at figures for the purchases of US Treasury Securities from an article by Floyd Norris of the NY Times: "For a Change, U.S. Debt Is Staying in the U.S."

The most interesting fact is that Americans themselves are now buying most of this debt. This is not unusual. Most of Japan's debt for example is bought by the Japanese themselves. This amounts to what Hugh Stretton calls "borrowing from ourselves" and therefore removes foreign risk. It also helps to keep interest rates lower.

According to Norris:

Before the financial crisis struck in 2008, neither Americans nor private foreign investors showed much eagerness to finance Washington’s deficits.

In calendar year 2007, the Treasury borrowed a net $237 billion. Of that, 81 percent came from foreign governments, mostly from central banks. Private foreign investors took up the rest, as American companies, banks and individuals reduced their combined Treasury holdings by $13 billion.

In the first six months of this year, the Treasury numbers indicate that foreign governments reduced their holdings of Treasury securities by $10 billion. Not since 2000 — when the United States government was running a surplus and did not need additional funds — have foreign governments been net sellers for a full calendar year.

But then again in a globalising financial world, Norris notes also that often it is not exactly clear who the buyers may be:

The figures are estimates by the Treasury and are subject to substantial revision. And they need to be interpreted with caution, because they do not necessarily reflect the ultimate ownership of securities. Holdings of a London-based money manager are attributed to Britain, even though that manager’s clients could live in New York, Hong Kong or Paris.

The trend, however, is clear:

Over all, domestic investors purchased more Treasuries than did overseas ones — including foreign governments — in 2009 and again in the first half of this year. Those purchases came as government borrowing rose to pay for bailouts and recession-related spending.

By contrast, during the six years from 2002 — the first year that the United States ran a significant deficit after the years of surpluses — through 2007, three-quarters of the $1.7 trillion in new borrowing came from abroad, with $1 trillion of that coming from foreign governments.

In the two and a half years since the end of 2007, the Treasury has raised twice that amount in new money, $3.5 trillion. More than half of that came from American companies and individuals, double the proportion they contributed in the earlier period.

Still more than 46 per cent of debt is held by foreigners, down from 46 per cent in 2008:

Even with those increased domestic purchases, 46 percent of the publicly issued Treasury debt is held overseas. That is down from 49 percent in early 2008, just before the financial crisis began, but it is way above the 31 percent proportion at the end of 2001.

The figures also don't include debt bought by the Federal Reserve itself, which involves a notion called quantitative easing, colloquially known as "printing money"

The figures exclude Treasury securities owned by the Federal Reserve or other United States government agencies. As a result, Fed purchases and sales are not counted.

Chinese foreign investment

Trolling through some articles from a few months ago I found this one "Tracking Where China Invests" by Derek Scissors from the Heritage Foundation (HF). In it he discusses the HF's China Investment Tracker.

This interactive display is pretty neat as it shows Chinese investment growing over time.

Now the HF is a conservative think tank and its purpose behind providing such data may be different than mine, but it does provides a valuable resource that is worth looking at if you want to know more about Chinese outward investment.

One of the interesting points that Scissors makes is about the announcement of deals may not actually result in subsequent investment. He uses Venezuela as an example but it could possibly apply to Australia. Governments in Australia love making announcements of 50 billion of this and 20 billion of that but these figures are much more arbitrary and conditional than governments suggest.

The other interesting fact is that Australia has been the largest recipient of Chinese (non-bond) investment in recent times. The US wins hands down in total Chinese investment of course because of China's huge appetite for US dollar assets.

Now whether you think Chinese investment is a good thing or not, it's important to start with the facts

China's hefty investments in sub-Saharan Africa have received deserved attention, but its investment in Latin America has been overblown by some. One reason is a common event in bilateral commercial transactions--grand announcements that never come to fruition. In mid-April Venezuela proclaimed a $20 billion oil-for-loans deal with China, but Caracas' track record in this area encourages skepticism. China has little investment in the Arab world, which is perhaps surprising in light of its focus on energy, but it has sizable engineering and construction contracts there. Australia, at $30 billion, is the single biggest draw for Chinese investment. The U.S. is second at $21 billion, Iran third at $11 billion.

The places where the Chinese have invested most often are also the places where their investments have been most often thwarted: Australia, the U.S. and Iran, in that order. Failures stem from a variety of causes, such as nationalist reactions in host countries, objections by Chinese regulators and mistakes by the Chinese firms themselves. According to the Heritage tracker, the value of failed investments from 2005 to 2009 is a staggering $130 billion. Chinese investment could have been a full 40% larger than it was had the failed deals closed.

He also points out that the biggest recipients of investment have also been the biggest blockers of Chinese investment:

The places where the Chinese have invested most often are also the places where their investments have been most often thwarted: Australia, the U.S. and Iran, in that order. Failures stem from a variety of causes, such as nationalist reactions in host countries, objections by Chinese regulators and mistakes by the Chinese firms themselves. According to the Heritage tracker, the value of failed investments from 2005 to 2009 is a staggering $130 billion. Chinese investment could have been a full 40% larger than it was had the failed deals closed.

The last point is slightly spurious because if investment had succeeded in one place it might not have gone ahead elsewhere.

The potential for Chinese investment growth is huge, but let's keep it all in perspective. In terms of the total stock of foreign investment in Australia Chinese investment is currently minute. The latest edition of the ABS's
5352.0 - International Investment Position, Australia: Supplementary Statistics, 2008 reveals that:

Level of foreign investment in Australia
The level of foreign investment in Australia increased by $66.9 billion to reach $1,724.4 billion at 31 December 2008. Portfolio investment accounted for $921.2 billion (53%), direct investment for $392.9 billion (23%), other investment liabilities for $302.6 billion (18%) and financial derivatives for $107.8 billion (6%). Of the portfolio investment liabilities, debt securities accounted for $689.1 billion (40%) and equity securities for $232.1 billion (13%).
The leading investor countries at 31 December 2008 were:
United Kingdom ($427.1 billion or 25%)
United States of America ($418.4 billion or 24%)
Japan ($89.5 billion or 5%)
Hong Kong (SAR of China) ($56.3 billion or 3%)
Singapore ($43.1 billion or 2%)
Switzerland ($38.1 billion or 2%)

In addition, the level of borrowing raised on international capital markets (e.g. Eurobonds) was $145.3 billion or 8%.

China doesn't make it into the top 5, although much Chinese mainland investment comes through Hog Kong (4th at 3 per cent) and through various other sources such as tax havens like the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.

So the current position is that Chinese investment in Australia is growing rapidly but from a very low base.
Despite the huge focus on Chinese investment, what has gone largely unnoticed is the considerable increase in Japanese investment, which is much wider in scope than Chinese investment. On this see "Japanese investment in Australia slips under the radar" by Rick Wallace in The Australian. 

A Wave of Japanese investment in Australia is being driven by Japan's economic stagnation and the need for its corporations to seek fresh growth strategies and a secure supply of food and energy.

The key focus of foreign investment has been China in the past two years, but direct investment from Japan to Australia hit $36 billion in 2008, up more than 50 per on 2006 levels, and is predicted to keep growing.

The figure eclipses the long-term average of $3.3bn of yearly direct investment from Japan, as well as the 2008 total of Chinese direct investment in Australia of $3bn.

The breadth of the investment -- in Australia's food, beverage, technology, financial services, energy, manufacturing, mining and resources sectors -- differentiates the current wave of Japanese investment from the property speculation of the late 1980s.

High-profile Chinese resources deals have captured the headlines, but Japanese companies and investment funds have quietly closed out at least $17bn of mergers and acquisitions since 2007.